[NTLUG:Discuss] Corel Linux
MadHat
madhat at unspecific.com
Mon Feb 28 09:43:02 CST 2000
A recent post to Bugtraq[2] mentions several exploits on Corel Linux.
I know there are lots of exploit announcements, but I thought this one
was worth pointing out to the list. If you are running Corel, you can
either disable the commands[1] mentioned, or change to another Distro.
[1] 'chmod'ing is easy, 'chmod 000 /path/to/command', but won't get rid
of the problem, just protect against people using it if they gain access
to your system. Removing them would work, but may cause problems.
[2] http://www.securityfocus.com/ then click on Forums, then Bugtraq.
for those who aren't familiar with it:
"BugTraq is a full disclosure moderated mailing list for the *detailed*
discussion and announcement of computer security vulnerabilities: what
they are, how to exploit them, and how to fix them." *WARNING* This
can be a high traffic list.
--- QUOTED FROM BUGTRAQ ----
suid at suid.kg - Corel xconf utils local root (among others)
vulnerability.
Advisory Author: suid at suid.kg
Software: Corel Linux 1.0 xconf utilities
URL: http://linux.corel.com
Version: Version 1.0
Platforms: Corel Linux only.
Summary:
Local users can take advantage of lack of input validation and
the lack of privilege dropping to gain root access, or perform
a denial of service attack on Corel Linux systems.
Vulnerabilities:
There are multiple vulnerabilities. I know I have missed some
here. For example, I saw some /tmp files being used with the
return value of time(NULL) as an attempt at selecting a unique
filename. I haven't written these up here however.
(1) Appending garbage XF86Config data to any file on the system
/sbin/buildxconf does no input validation and is setuid
root.
Invoking it with the -f argument, a user can specify a
filename
to output to. Example /etc/shadow.
(2) Replacing the first line of any existing file with garbage.
As above, no input validation. When invoked with the -x
command buildxconf replaces the first line of the specified
file with the path/filename of an X server. An effective
denial of service against /etc/passwd root account.
(3) Create root owned world writable files anywhere on the file
system.
Again, buildxconf does no input validation or directory
permission checks. specifying -x or -f on a non existent
filename creates that file mode 0666. Set your umask to 0.
(4) Executing arbitrary commands with euid root.
A touch different. /sbin/setxconf allows users to test X
configs
with the -T switch. This process eventually invokes xinit
with
euid root. A quick look at the xinit man page will tell you
that xinit looks at ~/.xserverrc and will execute things in
there
while starting.
In the interests of keeping this post short I have left the rest of this
advisory off. If your interested in exploit/workaround information
visit:
http://www.suid.kg/advisories/007.txt
Regards,
suid at suid.kg
--
%_=split';','f; Perl ;h;st a;o;ker;@;not;.;hac;u;her;d;ju';
print map $_{$_}, split //,
'madhat at unspecific.com'
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